.

Military differences and army jealousies existed from the beginning,
which were aggravated and stimulated by partisan friends and opponents
of the rival officers, and by dissent from the policy pursued in the
conduct of military affairs to which many took exception.

General Scott was the military oracle of the Administration in the first
days of the war. His ability and great experience entitled him to regard
and deference on all questions relating to military operations. No one
appreciated his qualities more than the President, unless it was General
Scott himself, who with great self-esteem was nevertheless not
unconscious that his age and infirmities had impaired his physical
energies, and in some respects unfitted him to be the active military
commander. It was his misfortune that he prided himself more if possible
on his civil and political knowledge and his administrative ability than
on his military skill and capacity. As a politician his opinions were
often chimerical, unstable, and of little moment; but his military
knowledge and experience were valuable. With headquarters at Washington,
and for thirty years consulted and trusted by successive administrations
of different parties in important emergencies, internal and external,
and at one time the selected candidate of one of the great political
parties for President, he had reason to feel that he was an important
personage in the republic; also that he was competent, and that it was a
duty for him to participate in political matters, and to advise in civil
affairs when there were threatened dangers. But while he was sagacious
to detect the premonitory symptoms of disturbance, and always ready to
obey and execute military orders, he was in political and civil matters
often weak, irresolute, and infirm of purpose. He had in the autumn of
1860 warned President Buchanan of danger to be apprehended from the
secession movement, and wisely suggested measures to preserve peace; but
he soon distrusted and abandoned his own suggestions. Without much
knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, and believing erroneously, as did many others,
that Mr. Seward was to be the controlling mind in the new
administration, he early put himself in communication with that
gentleman. The two agreed upon the policy of surrendering or yielding to
the States in secession the fortresses within their respective limits.
It has been said, and circumstances indicate that there was also an
understanding by