n advocate addressing a jury, being indeed far
too good for any jury; but in arguing a point of law his unerring
logic, the lucidity with which he stated his position, the cogency and
precision with which he drew his inferences, made it a delight to
listen to him. The chain of ratiocination seemed irrefragable:

+en d' ethet' akmotheto megan akmona, kopte de desmous
arrhektous alutous, ophr' empedon authi menoien.+[26]

He had, indeed, but one fault as an arguer. He could not argue a point
whose soundness he doubted as effectively as one in which he had
faith; and when it befell that several points arose in a case, and the
Court seemed disposed to lay more stress on the one for which he cared
little than on the one he deemed conclusive, he refused to fall in
with their view and continued to insist upon that which his own mind
approved.

I remember to have once heard him and Cairns argue before the House of
Lords (sitting as the final Court of Appeal) a case relating to a
vessel called the _Alexandra_--it was a case arising out of an
attempt of the Confederates, during the American War of Secession, to
get out of a British port a cruiser they had ordered. Cairns spoke
first with all his usual power, and seemed to have left nothing to be
added. But when Mellish followed on the same side, he set his points
in so strong a light, and placed his contention on so solid a basis,
that even Cairns's speech was forgotten, and it seemed impossible that
any answer could be found to Mellish's arguments. One felt as if the
voice of pure reason were speaking through his lips.

Such an intellect might seem admirably qualified for judicial work.
But as a judge, Mellish, admirable though he was in temper, in
fairness, in learning, and in logic, did not win so exceptional a
reputation as he had won at the Bar. People used to ascribe this
partly to his weak health, partly to the fact that he, who had been a
common-law practitioner, was sitting in a court which heard equity
appeals, and alongside of a quick and strong colleague reared in the
equity courts.[27] But something may have been due to the fact that he
needed the stimulus of conflict to bring out the full force of his
splendid intelligence. A circumstance attending the appointment of
Mellish illustrates the remark already made that a great counsel whose
work lies apart from so-called "sensation cases" may remain unknown to
his contemporaries. When Mr. Gladstone,