their hill fights the
Afghans never come to close quarters. Posted behind rocks and huge
boulders, the opposing sides keep up a distant musketry
duel--lasting, sometimes, for days--until one side or the other
becomes disheartened with its losses, or has exhausted its
ammunition. Then it falls back, and the other claims the victory.
The idea that English soldiers would, under a heavy fire from their
concealed force, steadily climb up the broken mountainside, and
come to close quarters, probably never entered into their
calculations.

At daybreak on the 6th, a working party were sent forward to
improve the road towards the defile. But they had scarcely started
when the cavalry patrol in advance rode in, and announced that the
enemy were in great strength on the hills, and had guns in position
to command the road.

General Roberts had now a choice of two courses--he could either
attack the whole Afghan force, with the one division at hand; or he
could wait until joined by Macpherson's brigade, next morning. The
feat of carrying such a position in face of an immensely superior
force, with only half of his little command, was a very serious one
but, upon the other hand, every hour added to the number of hillmen
who swarmed upon the flanks of the army, just beyond musket range.
A delay of twenty-four hours would bring the whole fighting force
of the tribesmen into the valley and, while attacking the enemy's
position in the front, he would be liable to an assault upon his
rear, by them.

Confident in the valor of his soldiers, he chose the first
alternative and, at eleven o'clock, his little force marched out
from the camp to attack the Afghan army. By this time the enemy's
position had been reconnoitered, and it was found to be too strong
for a direct attack. It was therefore resolved to ascend the hills
on both flanks, and so to drive their defenders back beyond the
defile. This, in any case, would have been the best mode of
assault; but against semi-savage enemies, flank attacks are
peculiarly effective. Having prepared for an assault in one
direction, they are disconcerted and disheartened by finding
themselves attacked in a different manner; and the fear of a flank
being turned, and the line of retreat thereby menaced, will
generally suffice to cause a rapid retreat.

General Baker, himself, took the command of the left attack. His
force consisted of four guns of Number 2 Mountain Battery, two
Gatling guns, the 7t