ted fate of Charleston, like the misfortunes of 1776, has at
last called forth a spirit, and kindled up a flame, which perhaps
no other event could have produced. If the enemy has circulated a
falsehood, they have unwisely aggravated us into life, and if they have
told us the truth, they have unintentionally done us a service. We were
returning with folded arms from the fatigues of war, and thinking and
sitting leisurely down to enjoy repose. The dependence that has been
put upon Charleston threw a drowsiness over America. We looked on the
business done--the conflict over--the matter settled--or that all which
remained unfinished would follow of itself. In this state of dangerous
relaxation, exposed to the poisonous infusions of the enemy, and having
no common danger to attract our attention, we were extinguishing, by
stages, the ardor we began with, and surrendering by piece-meal the
virtue that defended us.

Afflicting as the loss of Charleston may be, yet if it universally rouse
us from the slumber of twelve months past, and renew in us the spirit of
former days, it will produce an advantage more important than its loss.
America ever is what she thinks herself to be. Governed by sentiment,
and acting her own mind, she becomes, as she pleases, the victor or the
victim.

It is not the conquest of towns, nor the accidental capture of
garrisons, that can reduce a country so extensive as this. The
sufferings of one part can never be relieved by the exertions of
another, and there is no situation the enemy can be placed in that does
not afford to us the same advantages which he seeks himself. By dividing
his force, he leaves every post attackable. It is a mode of war that
carries with it a confession of weakness, and goes on the principle of
distress rather than conquest.

The decline of the enemy is visible, not only in their operations, but
in their plans; Charleston originally made but a secondary object in the
system of attack, and it is now become their principal one, because
they have not been able to succeed elsewhere. It would have carried a
cowardly appearance in Europe had they formed their grand expedition, in
1776, against a part of the continent where there was no army, or not
a sufficient one to oppose them; but failing year after year in their
impressions here, and to the eastward and northward, they deserted their
capital design, and prudently contenting themselves with what they can
get, give a flourish