imputed to the President.

Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to
the article in which the President was charged with the violation of
the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the
office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the
proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the
interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed
to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The
proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the
Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their
offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have
been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal
by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained
exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who
held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate
were secure in their places unless the Senate should assent to their
removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming
President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor.
The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal
to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers
that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming
President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty
days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference
whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during
his term.

There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess
historical value. By the Constitution the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the
President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice
Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as "Chief Justice." That
claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some
members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the
presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed
by the managers and some of the Senators as "Mr. President."

There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference
between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the
right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and
evidence arising in the course of the