ys that this phenomenon is inevitable. If he does not
know them, he considers it as an accident, and this corresponds in the
physical field to the arbitrary phenomenon of the human will which does
not know whether it shall decide this way or that. For instance, some of
us were of the opinion, and many still are, that the coming and going of
meteorological phenomena was accidental and could not he foreseen. But
in the meantime, science has demonstrated that they are likewise subject
to the law of causality, because it discovered the causes which enable
us to foresee their course. Thus weather prognosis has made wonderful
progress by the help of a network of telegraphically connected
meteorological stations, which succeeded in demonstrating the connection
between cause and effect in the case of hurricanes, as well as of any
other physical phenomenon. It is evident that the idea of accident,
applied to physical nature, is unscientific. Every physical phenomenon
is the necessary effect of the causes that determined it beforehand. If
those causes are known to us, we have the conviction that that
phenomenon is necessary, is fate, and, if we do not know them, we think
it is accidental. The same is true of human phenomena. But since we do
not know the internal and external causes in the majority of cases, we
pretend that they are free phenomena, that is to say, that they are not
determined necessarily by their causes. Hence the spiritualistic
conception of the free will implies that every human being, in spite of
the fact that their internal and external conditions are necessarily
predetermined, should be able to come to a deliberate decision by the
mere fiat of his or her free will, so that, even though the sum of all
the causes demands a no, he or she can decide in favor of yes, and vice
versa. Now, who is there that thinks, when deliberating some action,
what are the causes that determine his choice? We can justly say that
the greater part of our actions are determined by habit, that we make up
our minds almost from custom, without considering the reason for or
against. When we get up in the morning we go about our customary
business quite automatically, we perform it as a function in which we do
not think of a free will. We think of that only in unusual and grave
cases, when we are called upon to make some special choice, the
so-called voluntary deliberation, and then we weigh the reasons for or
against; we ponder, we hesitat