ment of chance in human life is indicated by the order of
the lots. But chance, however adverse, may be overcome by the wisdom
of man, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a worse enemy to man
than chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately fortunate in
the number of the lot--even the very last comer--might have a good life
if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an assertion
which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few sentences
afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue
which is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose;
he must add to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed
in new circumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is
an inferior sort of goodness; and, as Coleridge says, 'Common sense
is intolerable which is not based on metaphysics,' so Plato would have
said, 'Habit is worthless which is not based upon philosophy.'

The freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is
distinctly asserted. 'Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours
her he will have more or less of her.' The life of man is 'rounded'
by necessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him
(Pol.). But within the walls of necessity there is an open space in
which he is his own master, and can study for himself the effects which
the variously compounded gifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul,
and act accordingly. All men cannot have the first choice in everything.
But the lot of all men is good enough, if they choose wisely and will
live diligently.

The verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years,
by the intimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before;
the coincidence of Er coming to life on the twelfth day after he was
supposed to have been dead with the seven days which the pilgrims passed
in the meadow, and the four days during which they journeyed to the
column of light; the precision with which the soul is mentioned who
chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that there was no definite
character among the souls, and that the souls which had chosen ill
blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls drank
more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself
was hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last,
unlike the conception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned
ignoran