vagant demands on our self-denial. As Christianity, even while
bidding us to seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness,
promises that all other things shall be added unto us, so
Utilitarianism, even while insisting on our seeking first to please
others, permits, nay, directs, us to take as much pleasure for ourselves
as we can lay hold of without depriving others, since the aggregate of
happiness which it is incumbent upon us to augment to the best of our
ability would otherwise be less. Nay, for the same reason, it
disapproves of our foregoing any pleasure of our own, the full
equivalent of which is not transferred to others. The happiness which it
requires us to attend to is that of a society of which each of us is a
component member, and no member of which can deny himself any pleasure
within his reach, and beyond the reach of others, without diminishing
the total of happiness which the whole society might enjoy. 'As between
his own happiness and that of others,' says Mr. Mill, 'Utilitarianism
requires an agent to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and
benevolent spectator.' Thus qualified, the prescribed subordination of
one's own to the general good is no such extravagantly self-denying
ordinance. If for anything, it might rather be reproached for its cold,
calculating equity. With reference quite as much to individual as to
communal happiness it is an excellent rule of conduct, against which not
a word could be said, provided only it were left to be adopted
voluntarily, and were not authoritatively imposed.

Unfortunately, however, Utilitarianism allows no option in the matter.
Unless we do our very utmost to promote the general weal, at whatever
sacrifice to ourselves, it charges us with sin of omission. In the words
of one of the ablest among able Editors, 'justice is the social idea in
its highest, widest, and most binding expression.... It signifies the
moral principle which obliges each so to shape his conduct and
relations, his claims and his achievements, that they harmonise with the
highest good of all.'[4] To which doctrine of Mr. Morley's, if other
Utilitarians do not subscribe, it can only be because they are less
resolutely logical. Mr. Mill, indeed, though dissenting in appearance on
this point from Mr. Morley, agrees with him in substance. Even when on
one occasion, distinguishing between duty and virtue, he says that there
are innumerable acts and forbearances of human beings which