to love nothing," he has written somewhere, and even
underscored it--that is to say, it is necessary to hover impartially
above all objective points. And, in fact, as nothing passed before his
eyes that he considered did not lie within the possibility of
representation, he made it a law unto himself to look nothing in the
face except from this point of view.

In this regard one may compare his attitude in the presence of his model
to that of his contemporaries, Renan, for example, or Taine, in the
presence of the object of their studies. With them also critical
impartiality resembles not only indifference but insensibility. Not only
have they refused to confound their emotions with their judgments, but
their judgments have no value in their eyes except as they separate them
from their emotions,--as they emancipate themselves from them or even
place themselves in opposition to them. In like manner did Flaubert. The
first condition of an exact representation of things is to dominate
them; and in order to dominate them, is it not necessary to begin by
detaching yourself from them? We see dimly through tears, and we are
too much absorbed in that which gives us pleasure to be good judges of
it. "An ideal society would be one where each individual performed his
duty according to his ability. Now, then, I do my duty as best I can;
I am forsaken.... No one pities my misfortunes; those of others
occupy their attention! I give to humanity what it gives to
me--_indifference!_" Is not the link between Flaubert's "indifference"
and his conception of art evident here?

But Flaubert said besides: "Living does not concern me! It is only
necessary to shun suffering." Should we not change the name of this to
"egotism" or "insensibility?" We might, indeed, did we not know that
this egotism germinated in Flaubert as a means of discipline. The object
of this discipline was to concentrate, for the profit of his art, those
qualities or forces which the ordinary man dissipates in the pursuit of
useless pleasures, or squanders in intensity of life.

We may take account at the same time of the nature of his pessimism. For
there are many ways of being a pessimist, and Flaubert's was not at all
like that of Schopenhauer or Leopardi. His pessimism, real and sincere,
proceeded neither from personally grievous experiences of life, as did
that of the recluse of Recanati, nor from a philosophic or logical view
of the conditions of existence in which