sador, the court
was forced by popular opinion to withdraw from Berlin to Breslau, out
of the sphere of French influence. Napoleon's answer soon arrived;
there was no word of payment, and no binding engagement as to
territory--merely a repetition of vague promises. Frederick William
was disappointed, and reluctantly consented to the mobilization of his
now regenerated and splendid army. He cherished the hope of keeping
Alexander behind the Vistula, and forcing Napoleon to an armistice
before he could cross the Elbe.

But Hardenberg, Stein, and Scharnhorst were all convinced that there
could be no peace in Europe without restoring the ancient balance of
power and annihilating Napoleon's preponderance, especially since,
from every class in the nation, came addresses and petitions
expressing detestation of French rule. Moreover, the long, difficult
process of German unification was, in a sense, complete. "I have but
one fatherland, and that is Germany," wrote Stein, in December, 1812;
"the dynasties are indifferent to me in this moment of mighty
development." A born and consistent liberal, he abhorred alike the
tyranny of Napoleon, of Francis, of Alexander, and of his own king.
But the Czar loved him, since a united Germany would be indifferent to
those Polish provinces about which Prussia cared so much. Certain,
therefore, of the Russian monarch, the great statesman determined to
join Frederick William at Breslau, and urge on the work of mobilizing
troops. Already, by Alexander's authority, he had induced the estates
of eastern Prussia to sanction York's action, and to provide for
arming the militia and reserves. Their ready compliance was the more
significant because the German patriot had to some extent been out of
touch with the general movement, having consistently and from
principle refused to work through the popular League of Virtue, or any
secret association whatsoever, and having become in his long exile a
virtual stranger among the Prussians.

It is scarcely possible within moderate limits to give the faintest
conception of Prussia at the opening of 1813. The popular hatred of
Napoleon was defiant; the death of Queen Louisa had made the King
sullen. There was a splendid army of a hundred and fifty thousand men,
and the statesmen had managed so well that there were arms for every
able-bodied male between seventeen and twenty-four. Of these scarcely
any shirked; most volunteered, numbers paid, many did both. The