le at Ocana on November nineteenth,
1809; but since then his time had been virtually wasted, for his
bickerings with Joseph and his jealousy of Massena made all his
successes, even this last one at Badajoz, entirely useless. In a short
time he returned to Cadiz, and the French before Lisbon remained
therefore without their auxiliaries.

Both these checks displeased Napoleon greatly. It is often stated that
it was because he felt contempt alike for the Spanish guerrillas and
the English infantry that he delegated the conduct of affairs in the
peninsula to his lieutenants. Quite the reverse appears to be the
truth. Foy, Massena's envoy, reached Paris about the end of November,
and found the Emperor in something like a dull fury. His personal
experience had now the confirmation of that undergone by Massena and
Soult, two of his greatest lieutenants. He had himself found the
rugged and ill-cultivated country unable to support large armies. It
was a discouraging fact that neither Soult nor Massena had succeeded
better than the great captain himself, and Napoleon was thus convinced
that the Continental System could not be enforced against such dogged
persistency as that of the unreasoning, disorganized, but courageous
and frenzied Spaniards, assisted by the cold, calculating, and lucky
Wellington: at least not without terrible cost in life and money.
Accordingly Massena was left without immediate reinforcement, while on
December tenth, 1809, was promulgated the decree incorporating the
North Sea coast into the Empire. Alexander chose to regard this
fateful act as merely disrespectful, remonstrated with the French
envoy at St. Petersburg, and sent a circular to the powers reserving
the rights of his house over Oldenburg; he refused the petty
indemnification of Erfurt offered by Napoleon, and a year later, in
December, 1810, issued a ukase which laid prohibitive duties on French
silks and wines, while at the same time it favored the "neutral"
traffic in English wares. But at the moment he bore the affront
without any menace of war, and merely called attention to the common
obligations of friendship between sovereigns. If the breach were to
occur, it must be plainly and manifestly Napoleon's doing.

Napoleon's failure to reinforce Massena left the situation before
Lisbon precarious. It cannot be proved that he understood all the
difficulties in Wellington's position, but it is not unlikely that he
did. Lisbon was overcrowded w