ion consisting chiefly of highlanders of the New Armies.
They had fought over this ground in the first days of the offensive, and
after a short rest had come back again to help to hold the positions
taken and to initiate "minor" operations. They were situated astride the
Potijze Road, due east of Ypres, and that is where the advance parties
from each battalion of the division found them. The first impression
was: "What a contrast with Havrincourt!" It was the exact antithesis in
every respect. This was a country where the desire to kill and destroy
had developed to an unimaginable intensity. Nothing of use was to be
left by either side, and every yard of ground almost was searched by the
gunners to carry out their cruel game.

As evidence of the meaning and determination of the business the
18-pounders were packed axle to axle amongst the mud and shell holes,
ready to bark forth their loud defiance to the Hun. The 4.5 howitzers
were visible in batches at various places. Further back, but still
closely packed were the 6-inch howitzers, the 60-pounders, and the
heavier calibre guns. The huge, ever popular 15-inch and large naval
guns lay beyond Ypres, and were not for the eyes of the ordinary
infantryman, but evidences of their sound work would be found when the
advance continued. It required very little imagination to picture the
German guns similarly placed and in similar numbers, for this offensive
had alarmed the enemy, for did it not threaten the existence of their
submarine bases in Belgium, to say nothing of their hold upon Lille? His
defence was careful, however, as we found to our cost, and, however much
the papers at home kept up the morale of England by sneers at the
"pill-box," the soldier on the spot regarded it with extreme caution and
respect. After all they were the only things that stood the test of this
bashing method of fighting and their very existence, when everything
else was destroyed, was ample proof of the fact. Tacticians from the
highest general to the platoon sergeant tried hard to discover the most
effective and least costly manner of "dealing with a pill-box," and the
highest in the land eagerly snatched at ideas from the man out of the
line if they bore the scent of feasibility about them.

One never knew if it was in pursuit of the solution of these tactical
problems that the higher command persisted during those sad August and
early September days in their policy of "minor" operations. Cer