admirably calculated to disarm prejudice. Come and let
us reason together, was his plea. Without any attempt to ignore the
most obnoxious parts of the act, he passed directly to the discussion
of the clauses which apparently denied the writ of _habeas corpus_ and
trial by jury to the fugitive from service. He reminded his hearers
that this act was supplementary to the Act of 1793. No one had found
fault with the earlier act because it had denied these rights. Both
acts, in fact, were silent on these points; yet in neither case was
silence to be construed as a denial of constitutional obligations. On
the contrary, they must be assumed to continue in full force under the
act. Misapprehension arose in these matters, because the recovery of
the fugitive slave was not viewed as a process of extradition. The act
provided for the return of the alleged slave to the State from which
he had fled. Trial of the facts by jury would then follow under the
laws of the State, just as the fugitive from justice would be tried in
the State where the alleged crime had been committed. The testimony
before the original court making the requisition, would necessarily be
_ex parte_, as in the case of the escaped criminal; but this did not
prevent a fair trial on return of the fugitive. Regarding the question
of establishing the identity of the apprehended person with the
fugitive described in the record, Douglas asserted that the terms of
the act required proof satisfactory to the judge or commissioner, and
not merely the presentment of the record. "Other and further evidence"
might be insisted upon.

At various times Douglas was interrupted by questions which were
obviously contrived to embarrass him. To all such he replied
courteously and with engaging frankness. "Why was it," asked one of
these troublesome questioners, "that the law provided for a fee of ten
dollars if the commissioner decided in favor of the claimant, and for
a fee of only five dollars if he decided otherwise? Was this not in
the nature of an inducement, a bribe?" "I presume," said Douglas,
"that the reason was that he would have more labor to perform. If,
after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided in favor of the
claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate the
necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if
he decided against him, he had no such labor to perform."

After all, as Douglas said good-naturedly, all these obj