third the partition of Asiatic Turkey, which affects the equilibrium of
the Eastern Mediterranean. It is impossible for Italy to keep out of the
solution of such problems unless she be satisfied to see not only the
powers of the Triple Entente settle these affairs according to their
interests, but also the small but audacious and resolute nation, Greece.

_From the Messaggero, March 17, 1915:_

The cession of the Trentino would be valueless if it implied the
abandonment of Italian aspirations in Venetia Giulia, (land west of the
Julian Alps,) in the Adriatic, and in Asia Minor, and submission to
German policy. We cannot obtain by neutrality the territory we want,
nor, if we renew the Triple Alliance, can we make an agreement with
Great Britain for our security in the Mediterranean.

VON BUELOW'S WORK AND PLEA FOR INTERVENTION.

_From the Corriere della Sera, Feb. 8, 1915:_

Happily our aspirations in the Adriatic, our interests in the Central
Mediterranean and in Northern Africa coincide admirably with the policy
which it is easiest for us to pursue. Unless we profit with the utmost
prudence, with the greatest circumspection, by the present rare
opportunity which history offers us to set the finishing touches to our
unification, to render our land and sea frontiers immeasurably more
secure than they are, to harmonize our foreign with our domestic policy,
we shall experience after the close of the war the darkest and most
difficult days of our existence. The crisis through which we are passing
is the gravest we have yet encountered. Let us make it a crisis of
growth, not a symptom of irreparable senile decay.

_From the Stampa, March 15, 1915:_

There is surely no possibility of an Austro-Italian war without German
intervention. If Italy attacks Austria, Germany will attack Italy; nor
will Austria make concessions, for Austria, like Turkey, never changes
her system, even when wrong.

_From the Giornale d'Italia, March 19, 1915:_

Italy either can obtain peacefully immediate and certain satisfaction of
her sacred aspirations, together with the protection of her great and
complex interests, or she can have recourse to the supreme test of arms.
It is absurd to think that Italy, after seven months of preparation,
when she is in an especially advantageous diplomatic and military
position, will be satisfied with the Biblical mess of pottage or
less--mere promises.

However negotiations go the great national inter