roops
should be allowed to cross the frontier in pursuit of the insurgents; at
the same time two of the Prussian army corps were mobilised and drawn up
along the Polish frontier.

The convention soon became known and it is easy to imagine the
indignation with which the Prussian people and the House of
Representatives heard of what their Government had done. The feeling was
akin to that which would have prevailed in America had the President
offered his help to the Spanish Government to suppress the insurrection
in Cuba. The answers to questions were unsatisfactory, and on February
26th Heinrich von Sybel rose to move that the interests of Prussia
required absolute neutrality. It was indeed evident that Bismarck's
action had completely isolated Prussia; except the Czar, she had now
not a single friend in Europe and scarcely a friend in Germany. Bismarck
began his answer by the taunt that the tendency to enthusiasm for
foreign nationalities, even when their objects could only be realised at
the cost of one's own country, was a political disease unfortunately
limited to Germany. It was, however, an unjust taunt, for no one had
done more than Sybel himself in his historical work to point out the
necessity, though he recognised the injustice, of the part Prussia had
taken in the partition of Poland; nobody had painted so convincingly as
he had, the political and social demoralisation of Poland. Bismarck then
dwelt on the want of patriotism in the House, which in the middle of
complicated negotiations did not scruple to embarrass their own
Government. "No English House of Commons," he said, "would have acted as
they did," a statement to which we cannot assent; an English Opposition
would have acted exactly as the majority of the Prussian Parliament did.
When a Minister is in agreement with the House on the general principles
of policy, then indeed there rests on them the obligation not to
embarrass the Government by constant interpolation with regard to each
diplomatic step; self-restraint must be exercised, confidence shewn.
This was not the case here; the House had every reason to believe that
the objects of Bismarck were completely opposed to what they wished;
they could not be expected to repose confidence in him. They used this,
as every other opportunity, to attempt to get rid of him.

The question of Poland is one on which Bismarck never altered his
attitude. His first public expression of opinion on foreign affairs w