to a lawful contract.
And, if the prince gives the subject leave to enter an action against
him, upon such contract, in his own courts, the action itself proceeds
rather upon natural equity, than upon the municipal laws." For the end
of such action is not to _compel_ the prince to observe the contract,
but to _persuade_ him. And, as to personal wrongs; it is well observed
by Mr Locke[q], "the harm which the sovereign can do in his own person
not being likely to happen often, nor to extend itself far; nor being
able by his single strength to subvert the laws, nor oppress the body
of the people, (should any prince have so much weakness and ill nature
as to endeavour to do it)--the inconveniency therefore of some
particular mischiefs, that may happen sometimes, when a heady prince
comes to the throne, are well recompensed by the peace of the public
and security of the government, in the person of the chief magistrate
being thus set out of the reach of danger."

[Footnote o: Finch. L. 255.]

[Footnote p: Law of N. and N. l. 8. c. 10.]

[Footnote q: on Gov. p. 2. Sec. 205.]

NEXT, as to cases of ordinary public oppression, where the vitals of
the constitution are not attacked, the law hath also assigned a
remedy. For, as a king cannot misuse his power, without the advice of
evil counsellors, and the assistance of wicked ministers, these men
may be examined and punished. The constitution has therefore provided,
by means of indictments, and parliamentary impeachments, that no man
shall dare to assist the crown in contradiction to the laws of the
land. But it is at the same time a maxim in those laws, that the king
himself can do no wrong; since it would be a great weakness and
absurdity in any system of positive law, to define any possible wrong,
without any possible redress.

FOR, as to such public oppressions as tend to dissolve the
constitution, and subvert the fundamentals of government, they are
cases which the law will not, out of decency, suppose; being incapable
of distrusting those, whom it has invested with any part of the
supreme power; since such distrust would render the exercise of that
power precarious and impracticable. For, whereever [Transcriber's
Note: wherever] the law expresses it's distrust of abuse of power, it
always vests a superior coercive authority in some other hand to
correct it; the very notion of which destroys the idea of sovereignty.
If therefore (for example) the two houses of parliame