ourt, or by command of the king's
majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board, or of any of
the privy council; he shall, upon demand of his counsel, have a writ
of _habeas corpus_, to bring his body before the court of king's bench
or common pleas; who shall determine whether the cause of his
commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain.
And by 31 Car. II. c. 2. commonly called _the habeas corpus act_, the
methods of obtaining this writ are so plainly pointed out and
enforced, that, so long as this statute remains unimpeached, no
subject of England can be long detained in prison, except in those
cases in which the law requires and justifies such detainer. And, lest
this act should be evaded by demanding unreasonable bail, or sureties
for the prisoner's appearance, it is declared by 1 W. & M. st. 2. c.
2. that excessive bail ought not to be required.

[Footnote g: c. 29.]

[Footnote h: 5 Edw. III. c. 9. 25 Edw. III. st. 5. c. 4. and 28 Edw.
III. c. 3.]

OF great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal
liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest,
magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought
proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown) there would
soon be an end of all other rights and immunities. Some have thought,
that unjust attacks, even upon life, or property, at the arbitrary
will of the magistrate, are less dangerous to the commonwealth, than
such as are made upon the personal liberty of the subject. To bereave
a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without
accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of
despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the
whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him
to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten; is a less
public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of
arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real
danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our
constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to
determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render this
measure expedient. For the parliament only, or legislative power,
whenever it sees proper, can authorize the crown, by suspending the
_habeas corpus_ act for a short and limited time, to imprison
suspected persons without giving any