e war, as we may judge from the
abortive efforts of Phips and Schuyler, this defect could be corrected.
Arising, as it did arise, from a lack of unity among the colonies, it
was even indicative of latent strength. From one angle, localism seems
selfishness and weakness; from another, it shows the vigorous life of
separate {134} communities, each self-centred and jealous of its
authority because the local instinct is so vitally active. It only
needed time to broaden the outlook and give the English colonies a
sense of their common interest. Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts,
by striking their roots each year more deeply into the soil of America,
became more and more self-supporting states in everything save name and
political allegiance; while New France, which with its austere climate
would have developed more slowly in any case, remained dependent on the
king's court.

Thus Frontenac's task was quite hopeless, if we define it as the effort
to overthrow English power in America. But neither he nor any one of
that age defined his duties so widely. In 1689 Canada was in extremes,
with the Iroquois at Lachine and Dongan threatening an attack from New
York. Frontenac's policy was defensive. If he struck first, it was
because he considered audacity to be his best safeguard. No one knew
better than Frontenac that a successful raid does not mean conquest.

[1] Louis Hector de Callieres-Bonnevue was a captain of the French army
who became governor of Montreal in 1684, and succeeded Frontenac as
governor of Canada in 1698. He received the Cross of St Louis for
distinguished service against the Iroquois. Frontenac could not have
had a better lieutenant.

{135}

CHAPTER VIII

FRONTENAC'S LAST DAYS

Though the English might withdraw from Quebec, New France always had
the Iroquois with her. We must now pursue the thread of Frontenac's
dealings with the savages from the moment when he replaced Denonville.

It requires no flight of the imagination to appreciate the rage
Frontenac must have felt when, on returning to Canada, he saw before
his eyes the effects of La Barre's rapacity and Denonville's perfidy,
of which the massacres of Lachine and La Chesnaye furnished the most
ghastly proofs. But in these two cases the element of tragedy was so
strong as to efface the mood of exasperation. There remained a third
incident which must have provoked pure rage. This was the destruction
of Fort Frontenac, b