t here, or at this point, that we intend to discuss the
propriety of the measure which was then proposed. Unfortunately, we
are called upon to do so with reference to our own times, as well as
to those which are now matter of history; and the remarks which we
shall have occasion to offer are equally applicable to the one as to
the other. In the mean time, let us see how the mere alarm engendered
by that unlucky proposition affected Scotland, and what steps were
taken to resist the threatened change.

First of all, we have it in evidence that the open threat of the
ministerial scheme produced within the country more actual distress
and bankruptcies than had previously occurred during the period of the
previous depression. This may seem a paradox to a stranger; but the
reason will be readily understood, and the fact candidly admitted by
every one who is conversant with the Scottish system of banking. A
short explanation may be necessary. One large department of the
business of every bank was the granting of CASH-CREDITS; a method of
accommodation to the public which the experience of _ninety-four
years_ (cash-credits were granted by the Royal Bank of Scotland so
early as 1729) had shown not only to be the safest to the bank, but by
far the most advantageous to the public. Indeed it is not too much to
say, that were those credits prohibited, and no other alteration made
in the existing system, the mainspring of the machinery of Scottish
banking would be broken, and its general utility impaired. With that
point we shall deal more fully when we come to the consideration of
the system in detail; at present it is only necessary to remark, that
these credits had been maintained unimpaired during the period of
depression, and were the fortunate means of averting ruin from many.

But the attitude which the ministry assumed was so formidable, and the
prospect of a sweeping change so alarming, that the bankers were
forced in self-defence, though sorely against their will, to make
preparation for the worst contingencies. They were, so to speak,
compelled to follow the example of England in 1745--to recall all
their outlying forces from abroad, concentrate them at home, and leave
their allies to fight their own battles as they best could, and to
conquer or fall according to their ability or weakness. Their first
step was rigidly to refuse the granting of any new cash-credits; their
second, to withdraw--with as much tenderness as mig