eceived the money? Mr.
Middleton was at that very time in Calcutta, called down thither by Mr.
Hastings himself. One would naturally expect that he would call upon him
to explain for what purpose he left the money with Mr. Johnson. He did
no such thing. Did he examine Mr. Johnson himself, who was charged with
having received the money from Mr. Middleton? Did he ask him what he had
done with that money? Not one word. Did he send for Major Palmer and
Major Davy to account for it? No. Did he call any shroff, any banker,
any one person concerned in the payment of the money, or any one person
in the management of the revenue? No, not one. Directly in the face of
his own assertions, directly contrary to his moral conviction of the
fact that the money had been actually deposited, he tries Mr. Johnson
collusively and obliquely, not upon the account of what was done with
the money, but why it was prevented from being applied to the Company's
service; and he acquits him in a manner that (taking the whole of it
together) will give your Lordships the finest idea possible of a Bengal
judicature, as exercised by Mr. Hastings.

"I am not sorry," says he, "that Mr. Johnson chose to defeat my
intentions; since it would have added to the Nabob's distresses, but
with no immediate relief to the Company. If, in his own breast, he can
view the secret motives of this transaction, and on their testimony
approve it, I also acquit him."

Merciful God! Here is a man accused by regular articles of impeachment.
The accuser declares he is morally certain that the money had been
received, but was prevented from being applied to its destination by the
person accused; and he acquits him. Does he acquit him from his own
knowledge, or from any evidence? No: but he applies to the man's
conscience, and says, "If you in your conscience can acquit yourself, I
acquit you."

Here, then, is a proceeding the most astonishing and shameless that
perhaps was ever witnessed: a court trying a man for a delinquency and
misapplication of money, destined, in the first instance, for the use of
the judge, but which he declares ought, in his own opinion, to be set
apart for the public use, and which he was desirous of applying to the
Company's service, without regard to his own interest, and then the
judge declaring he is not sorry that his purpose had been defeated by
the party accused. Instead, however, of censuring the accused, he
applies to the man's own conscience.