ing
their knowledge to themselves. The grand effort which she made in 1809,
single-handed almost, to break the power of Napoleon, was everywhere
looked upon as something alike herculean and heroical, and as such it is
spoken of in all those historical works from which most readers obtain
knowledge of the early years of this century; but now we know from other
sources, and particularly from the Diary of Gentz, that she never was in
a worse state than she knew in the days of Eckmuehl, Essling, and Wagram.
Reading what Gentz wrote in the ten weeks that followed Wagram, we feel
as if we were reading of the twenty days that followed Sadowa. But of
this nobody outside of the empire seems to have known or suspected
anything; and the number of persons in the empire who knew it, or
suspected it, was not large. Even Napoleon, who was on the ground, and
who had the country more at his control than it was at that of Francis
II., seems to have been entirely ignorant of the true state of affairs.
He could have "crumpled up" Austria with ease, and have made half a
dozen kingdoms or grand duchies of the spoils he had seized,--and yet he
talked to General Bubna, and to others of the Austrian negotiators, as
if he considered Austria the greatest nation in Europe, and sure swiftly
to recover from the consequences of the blows he had dealt her. He
actually spoke of the ability she would secure to decide the future fate
of Europe, and therein was a prophet of his own ruin. It is possible
that there may have been some affectation in what he said, but there was
as much sincerity, for there is a great deal in the history of his
career that shows he had a high opinion of Austrian power. When Europe
was settled, after his fall, Austria acquired the right to stand between
England and Russia, as their equal; and down to 1848 she was the
superior of both France and Prussia. The events of 1848-49 did not
essentially lessen her prestige, and she had a commanding place during
the Russian war. Even her defeats in the Italian war did not lead to any
serious loss of consideration, and against them was set the striking
fact that the victorious French had halted before the Quadrilateral, and
actually had begged for peace from the vanquished.

We know how deceptive were all appearances in regard to Austrian
strength; but it was in the power of Austrian statesmen to convert what
was simply apparent into a solid reality. Had they been wise men, they
would, du