th despondent broodings over his health, even
if the latter were well founded, they are the voice of a mind which
has lost the spring of self-content. The sense of duty abides, but
dogged, cheerless; respondent rather to the force of habit than to the
generous ardor of former days.

For over two months after the flight to Palermo, the condition of
affairs for the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was seemingly critical to
the verge of desperation; for neither the preparations of the
Coalition, nor the hollowness of the French successes, were
understood, and news was slow to reach the remote city where the Court
now dwelt. The republican movement extended, though superficially, to
the toe of Italy, many of the towns in Calabria planting the tree of
liberty, and the new flag flying on the islands along the coast.
Sicily, though hostile to the French, was discontented with the
existing government, and disaffection there was feared. In that,
Nelson truly observed, lay the danger. "Respecting an invasion of the
French, I have no alarms; if this island is true to itself no harm can
happen." Nevertheless, "it is proper to be prepared for defence, and,"
if Calabria is occupied by the French, "the first object is the
preservation of Messina."

For this purpose he ordered the Portuguese squadron there, immediately
after he reached Palermo; and, when the outlook grew more threatening,
appealed to the Turkish and Russian admirals to send a detachment to
the Straits. General Stuart, commanding the troops in Minorca, which
had passed into the hands of Great Britain the previous November, was
entreated to detail a garrison for the citadel of Messina, as no
dependence was placed upon the Neapolitan troops. Stuart complied, and
the citadel was occupied by two English regiments about the 10th of
March. The danger, however, was considered sufficiently imminent to
withdraw to Palermo the transports lying at Syracuse; a step which
could not have been necessary had Nelson made Syracuse, as he at first
intended, the base of operations for the British fleet, and suggests
the idea, which he himself avows, that his own presence with the Court
was rather political than military[80] in its utility, dependent upon
the fears of their own subjects felt by the sovereigns. While these
measures were being taken he endeavored, though fruitlessly, to bring
matters to a conclusion at Alexandria and Malta, in order to release
the ships there employed and fetch