n of Austria, and yet not
convey a more perfect idea thereof than is comprehended by the preceding
paragraph!

Mr. Seward in first addressing Mr. Dayton discusses the slavery element
of the rebellion, and elucidates more particularly the relations of
France to a preserved or a dismembered Union; and evolves this plucky
sentence: 'The President neither expects nor desires any intervention,
_or even any favor_, from the government of France, or any other, in
this emergency.' But a still more spirited paragraph answers a question
often asked by the great public, 'What will be the course of the
administration should foreign intervention be given?' Foreign
intervention _would oblige us_ to treat those who should yield it as
allies of the insurrectionary party, and to carry on the war against
them as enemies. The case would not be relieved, but, on the contrary,
would only be aggravated, if _several_ European states should combine in
that intervention. _The President and the people of the United States
deem the Union which would then be at stake, worth all the cost and all
the sacrifices of a contest with the world in arms, if such a contest
should prove inevitable_.'

In the advices to Mr. Schurz, at Madrid, occurs a most ingenious
application of the doctrine of secession to Spanish consideration in
respect to Cuba and Castile; to Aragon and the Philippine Islands; as
well as a most opportune reference to the proffered commercial
confederate advantages. 'What commerce,' asks the Secretary, 'can there
be between states whose staples are substantially identical? Sugar can
not be exchanged for sugar, nor cotton for cotton.' And another sentence
is deserving remembrance for its truthful sarcasm: 'It seems the
necessity of faction in every country, that whenever it acquires
sufficient boldness to inaugurate revolution, it then alike forgets the
counsels of prudence, and stifles the instincts of patriotism, and
becomes a suitor to foreign courts for aid and assistance to subvert and
destroy the most cherished and indispensable institutions of its own.'

Thus, within six weeks succeeding his entrance into the chambers of
State, Mr. Seward had mapped out in his own brain a much more
comprehensive policy than he had even laboriously and ably outlined upon
paper. He had placed himself in magnetico-diplomatic communication with
the great courts of Europe; surrounded by place-seekers, dogged by
reporters, and paragraphed at by a thou