such contemporaries as Pomponius
Laetus, Bartolommeo Sacchi, Molza, Alessandro Farnese (Paul III),
Platina, Sabellicus at Rome; Pontanus, Sannazaro, and Porcello in Naples;
and Pomponasso and Boiardo at Ferrara, were then at or nearing their
prime, the position of Florence as the acknowledged centre of European
culture was conceded by sense of right alone. Than this nothing proves
more emphatically the strides learning had been making. It was no longer
the prerogative of the few, but the privilege of the many. From the
first, Lorenzo recognized what a strong card he held in the affection and
respect of the Italian as well as of the Florentine humanists.

The great secret of Lorenzo's preeminence in European and Italian, as
well as in Tuscan, politics lies in the fact that he was able to unite
the sources of administrative, legislative, and judicial power in
himself. All the public offices in Florence were held by his dependents,
and so entirely was the state machinery controlled by him that we find
such men as Louis XI and the emperor Maximilian, Alfonso of Naples,
and Pope Innocent VIII recognizing his authority and appealing to him
personally, in place of to the seigniory, to effect the ends they
desired. Such power enabled him to avoid the risks his grandfather Cosmo
had been compelled to run to maintain his authority. The Medicean
faction was better in hand than in his grandfather's days, and Lorenzo,
therefore, in playing the _role_ of the peacemaker of Italy, at the time
when he held the "balance of power" through his treaties with Milan,
Naples, and Ferrara, could speak with a decision that carried weight when
he found it necessary to threaten a restless "despot" with a political
combination that might depose him.

Lorenzo's services to learning were inspired by feelings infinitely more
noble than those actuating his political plans. A patriotism as lofty as
it was beneficent led him to desire that his country should be in the
van of Italian progress in Renaissance studies. His sagacious prevision
enabled him to proportion the nature and extent of the benefit he
conferred to the need it was intended to supply. Many statesmen do more
harm than good by failing to appreciate this law of supply and demand.
They grant more than is required, and that which should have been a boon
becomes a burden. Charles V, at the time of the Reformation, on more
than one occasion committed this error, as also did Wolsey and Mazarin.