enrolled all the soldiers he could muster among the Greek population of
Constantinople. But the inhabitants of that city were either unable or
unwilling to furnish recruits in proportion to their numbers. Bred up in
peaceful occupation, they probably possessed neither the activity nor the
habitual exercise which was required to move with ease under the weight
of armor then in use. So few were found disposed to fight for their
country that not more than six thousand Greek troops appeared under arms
during the whole siege.

The numerical weakness of the Greek army rendered it incapable of
defending so large a city as Constantinople, even with all the advantage
to be derived from strong fortifications. The Emperor was therefore
anxious to obtain the assistance of the warlike citizens of the Italian
republics, where good officers and experienced troops were then numerous.
As he had no money to engage mercenaries, he could only hope to succeed
by papal influence. An embassy was sent to Pope Nicholas V, begging
immediate aid, and declaring the Emperor's readiness to complete the
union of the churches in any way the Pope should direct. Nicholas
despatched Cardinal Isidore, the Metropolitan of Kiev, who had joined the
Latin Church, as his legate. Isidore had represented the Russian Church
at the Council of Florence; but on his return to Russia he was imprisoned
as an apostate, and with difficulty escaped to Italy. He was by birth
a Greek; and being a man of learning and conciliatory manners, it was
expected that he would be favorably received at Constantinople.

The Cardinal arrived at Constantinople in November, 1452. He was
accompanied by a small body of chosen troops, and brought some
pecuniary aid, which he employed in repairing the most dilapidated
part of the fortifications. Both the Emperor and the Cardinal deceived
themselves in supposing that the dangers to which the Greek nation and
the Christian Church were exposed would induce the orthodox to yield
something of their ecclesiastical forms and phrases. It was evident that
foreign aid could alone save Constantinople, and it was absurd to imagine
that the Latins would fight for those who treated them as heretics and
who would not fight for themselves. The crisis therefore compelled the
Greeks to choose between union with the Church of Rome or submission to
the Ottoman power. They had to decide whether the preservation of the
Greek empire was worth the ecclesiastical s