not called them
together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a
Proclamation before them; suggestions as to which would be in order,
after they had heard it read.

"Mr. Lovejoy was in error" when he stated "that it excited no comment,
excepting on the part of Secretary Seward. Various suggestions were
offered. Secretary Chase wished the language stronger, in reference to
the arming of the Blacks. Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the
policy, on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall
elections.

"Nothing, however, was offered, that I had not already
fully anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward
spoke. He said in substance: 'Mr. President, I approve of the
Proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this
juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our
repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a
step. It may be viewed as the last Measure of an exhausted Government,
a cry for help, the Government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia,
instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the Government.'

"His idea," said the President "was that it would be considered our last
shriek, on the retreat." (This was his precise expression.) "' Now,'
continued Mr. Seward, 'while I approve the Measure, I suggest, Sir, that
you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the Country supported
by Military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now,
upon the greatest disasters of the War!'"

Mr. Lincoln continued: "The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of
State, struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case
that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked.
The result was that I put the draft of the Proclamation aside, as you do
your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory."

It may not be amiss to interrupt the President's narration to Mr.
Carpenter, at this point, with a few words touching "the Military
Situation."

After McClellan's inexplicable retreat from before the Rebel Capital
--when, having gained a great victory at Malvern Hills, Richmond would
undoubtedly have been ours, had he but followed it up, instead of
ordering his victorious troops to retreat like "a whipped Army"--[See
General Hooker's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War.]--his recommendation, in the extraordinary letter (of July 7th) to
the President,