emand not merely a volume, but a
complete library, and even then it would be barely possible to pay full
tribute to the heroism of pilots of the war period. There are names
connected with that period of which the glory will not fade, names such
as Bishop, Guynemer, Boelcke, Ball, Fonck, Immelmann, and many others
that spring to mind as one recalls the 'Aces' of the period. In
addition to the pilots, there is the stupendous development of the
machines--stupendous when the length of the period in which it was
achieved is considered.

The fact that Germany was best prepared in the matter of
heavier-than-air service machines in spite of the German faith in the
dirigible is one more item of evidence as to who forced hostilities.
The Germans came into the field with well over 600 aeroplanes, mainly
two-seaters of standardised design, and with factories back in the
Fatherland turning out sufficient new machines to make good the
losses. There were a few single-seater scouts built for speed, and the
two-seater machines were all fitted with cameras and bomb-dropping gear.
Manoeuvres had determined in the German mind what should be the uses of
the air fleet; there was photography of fortifications and field works;
signalling by Very lights; spotting for the guns, and scouting for news
of enemy movements. The methodical German mind had arranged all this
beforehand, but had not allowed for the fact that opponents might take
counter-measures which would upset the over-perfect mechanism of the air
service just as effectually as the great march on Paris was countered by
the genius of Joffre.

The French Air Force at the beginning of the War consisted of upwards of
600 machines. These, unlike the Germans, were not standardised, but were
of many and diverse types. In order to get replacements quickly enough,
the factories had to work on the designs they had, and thus for a
long time after the outbreak of hostilities standardisation was an
impossibility. The versatility of a Latin race in a measure compensated
for this; from the outset, the Germans tried to overwhelm the French
Air Force, but failed, since they had not the numerical superiority,
nor--this equally a determining factor--the versatility and resource
of the French pilots. They calculated on a 50 per cent superiority to
ensure success; they needed more nearly 400 per cent, for the German
fought to rule, avoiding risks whenever possible, and definitely
instructed to save both