heir vanquished enemies, the numerous studs
of Cappadocia and Spain would have supplied new squadrons of cavalry;
the thirty-four arsenals of the empire were plentifully stored with
magazines of offensive and defensive arms: and the wealth of Asia might
still have yielded an ample fund for the expenses of the war. But the
effects which were produced by the battle of Hadrianople on the minds
of the Barbarians and of the Romans, extended the victory of the former,
and the defeat of the latter, far beyond the limits of a single day. A
Gothic chief was heard to declare, with insolent moderation, that, for
his own part, he was fatigued with slaughter: but that he was astonished
how a people, who fled before him like a flock of sheep, could still
presume to dispute the possession of their treasures and provinces.
[115] The same terrors which the name of the Huns had spread among the
Gothic tribes, were inspired, by the formidable name of the Goths, among
the subjects and soldiers of the Roman empire. [116] If Theodosius,
hastily collecting his scattered forces, had led them into the field
to encounter a victorious enemy, his army would have been vanquished
by their own fears; and his rashness could not have been excused by
the chance of success. But the great Theodosius, an epithet which he
honorably deserved on this momentous occasion, conducted himself as the
firm and faithful guardian of the republic. He fixed his head-quarters
at Thessalonica, the capital of the Macedonian diocese; [117] from
whence he could watch the irregular motions of the Barbarians,
and direct the operations of his lieutenants, from the gates of
Constantinople to the shores of the Hadriatic. The fortifications and
garrisons of the cities were strengthened; and the troops, among whom a
sense of order and discipline was revived, were insensibly emboldened
by the confidence of their own safety. From these secure stations, they
were encouraged to make frequent sallies on the Barbarians, who infested
the adjacent country; and, as they were seldom allowed to engage,
without some decisive superiority, either of ground or of numbers, their
enterprises were, for the most part, successful; and they were soon
convinced, by their own experience, of the possibility of vanquishing
their invincible enemies. The detachments of these separate garrisons
were generally united into small armies; the same cautious measures
were pursued, according to an extensive and well-c