d by him, and in order
to deliver them, has borrowed them, and given security in money at its
market price. Here he has placed himself in danger, because the owner
of the shares may at any time tender him this money and demand the
shares, which the bear may not be able to provide himself with, except
at the price which the owners choose to set upon them.

Thus a person might be under contract to deliver the shares of some
corporation which might be absolutely worthless, and yet these shares
_might_ be so held that the holders could exact one thousand dollars a
share. Given a railway with a share capital of ten millions, one
person or knot of persons might own every certificate of its stock,
and have it all loaned out to bears who had sold, borrowed, and
delivered it. It is obvious that this person or club of persons could
compel purchases of the shares which he or they alone possess, at
whatever price he or they think proper to demand; and since such
things can be done by skilful combinations under able generalship,
they have been done, and were a favorite scheme during the eventful
years between the sixties and the eighties. The corners in Harlem,
Hudson, Erie and Northwest, in which Vanderbilt, Drew, and Gould
achieved such success for themselves and their associates, have passed
into history as a conspicuous portion of the great events of Wall
Street. Their interest is chiefly historical, because of late years no
comprehensive corners have been organized. Share capitals are so large
that it is difficult for one man to control any one of them, and a
divided corner is apt to fail. But in their day and generation they
have offered brilliant illustrations of genius and strategic skill in
financial warfare.

The system of selling short, however, which gave birth to the idea of
creating corners, and which came into vogue in the fifties, has never
ceased to be a leading factor on the stock exchange. It was the result
of certain inflations of values which necessarily follow the
construction of great enterprises. However high a valuation may be set
upon any given commodity, there are always persons who expect a higher
price. Early historical examples of this fact are the South-Sea shares
and John Law's Mississippi shares, over which England and France
respectively went crazy in the last century. The loftier the figures
to which these shares mounted, the greater was the eagerness of the
public to buy them. But at that period