ond, to a Divine _judicial sentence_
following thereupon.

And finally, we answer that the theory which ascribes all events, both
in the natural and moral worlds, to the blind and inexorable dominion of
Destiny or Fate, leaves altogether unexplained many of the most certain
and familiar facts of human experience. There are two large classes of
facts which no theory of Fate can possibly explain. The first comprises
all those manifest indications of provident forethought, intelligent
design, and moral purpose, which appear in the course of Nature, and
which cannot be _accounted for_ by a blind, unintelligent, undesigning
cause. The second comprises all those facts of consciousness which bear
witness to the moral nature and responsible agency of man, as the
subject of a government which rewards and punishes his actions, in some
measure, even here, and which irresistibly suggests the idea of a future
reckoning and retribution. These two classes of facts must either be
ignored, or left as insoluble, by any theory which advocates blind Fate
or Destiny, in opposition to the overruling Providence and moral
government of God.

These answers are sufficient, if not to remove all mystery from the
methods of the Divine administration (for who would undertake to fathom
the counsels of Him "whose judgments are unsearchable and His ways past
finding out?"), yet to show at least that a Divine Providence is more
credible in itself, and better supported by evidence, than any theory of
Destiny or Fate; that the facts to which the latter appeals may be
explained consistently with the former, while the facts on which the
former is founded must either be left altogether out of view, or at
least left unexplained, if the doctrine of Fate be substituted for that
of Providence.

We have thus far compared the two theories of Chance and Fate, by which
some have attempted to explain the system of the universe, and have
contrasted both with the Christian doctrine of Providence. On a review
of the whole discussion, we think it must be evident that the latter
combines whatever is true and valuable in each of these opposite
theories, while it eliminates and rejects whatever is unsound or noxious
in either. It may seem strange that we should speak as if anything,
either true or valuable, could be involved in the theories of Chance and
Destiny; and, unquestionably, considered as theories designed to explain
the system of the world, and to supersede the