substance which
constitutes the foundation of Haeckel's philosophy--almost as if he
were purposely confuting that rather fly-blown production:--

"Thus, if any man think he has reason to believe that the
'_substance_' of matter, to the existence of which no limit can be
set either in time or space, is the infinite and eternal substratum
of all actual and possible existences, which is the doctrine of
philosophical materialism, as I understand it, I have no objection
to his holding that doctrine; and I fail to comprehend how it can
have the slightest influence upon any ethical or religious views he
may please to hold....

"Moreover, the ultimate forms of existence which we distinguish in
our little speck of the universe are, possibly, only two out of
infinite varieties of existence, not only analogous to matter and
analogous to mind, but of kinds which we are not competent so much
as to conceive--in the midst of which, indeed, we might be set
down, with no more notion of what was about us, than the worm in a
flower-pot, on a London balcony, has of the life of the great city.

"That which I do very strongly object to is the habit, which a
great many non-philosophical materialists unfortunately fall into,
of forgetting all these very obvious considerations. They talk as
if the proof that the 'substance of matter' was the 'substance' of
all things cleared up all the mysteries of existence. In point of
fact, it leaves them exactly where they were.... Your religious and
ethical difficulties are just as great as mine. The speculative
game is drawn--let us get to practical work" (p. 286).

And again on pp. 251 and 279:--

"It is worth any amount of trouble to ... know by one's own
knowledge the great truth ... that the honest and rigorous
following up of the argument which leads us to 'materialism'
inevitably carries us beyond it" (p. 251).

"To sum up. If the materialist affirms that the universe and all
its phenomena are resolvable into matter and motion, Berkeley
replies, True; but what you call matter and motion are known to us
only as forms of consciousness; their being is to be conceived or
known; and the existence of a state of consciousness, apart from a
thinking mind, is a contradiction in terms.

"I conceive that this reasoning is irrefragable. And, therefore, if
I were ob