ered loss, only a few of the
enemy's riflemen having paused and thought of firing at us. Muskets
they had discharged in the air, after their manner, when advancing
from their encampment. But that is one of their customs, employed to
work up a proper warlike ardour. Viewed from our side, it had been so
far the least dangerous battle ever soldier bore part in. For five,
ten minutes, less or more--the drama being enacted was too fearful and
fascinating for one to take note of time--Yacoub and his legions still
strove to breast the whirlwind of destruction involving them.
Battered, torn, rent into groups, the survivors at length began to
move off rapidly across our front, to their left. As yet there was no
running away, they were but changing direction and massing at another
point. With, if possible, swifter, deadlier fire they were followed
and driven. Maxims, Lee-Metfords, and Martini-Henrys from Maxwell's
brigade shattered the loose and weakened dervish columns. The few
rounds fired back at us by the enemy from their Krupp gun and rifled
cannon, which were stationed near the Khalifa's banner during the
first part of the action, did no harm. In fact, their shells burst two
or three hundred yards short of the zereba. At first they were
mistaken for badly-aimed shells fired by the gunboats, from which a
few pitched near us, or by the batteries upon our left. For a moment
the Sirdar was wroth at what was fancied to be our gunners' blundering
practice. It was quickly discovered, however, that the particular
shells in question were aimed by the dervishes. Very soon,--whether
settled by our guns, our Maxims, or by infantry volleys, I know
not,--the dervish cannon and their foolish efforts to shell our lines
troubled us no more. We knew afterwards that they had also got one of
their 5-barrelled Nordenfeldts to work for a while. Nobody in our
ranks, I think, was actually aware of the fact at the time, so
indifferent was the aiming and so bad the handling of the gun.

Still, the crucial stage of the first action was not over. The Sheikh
Ed Din had driven the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps from Um
Mutragan, inflicting loss upon them and getting temporary possession
of several guns of the horse battery. He was following them up
vigorously, and the Camel Corps, protected by the gunboats' fire, was
seeking shelter near the river and close to the north end of the
zereba, where it luckily succeeded in getting. It was after seven
a.m.