prolongation of the war.

The latest information with regard to the movements of De Wet had been
signalled by Haig, who appeared to hold the view that he had the
arch-guerilla hemmed in against the unfordable flood of the Orange
River in the immediate neighbourhood of the Colesberg waggon-bridge.
Now the brigadier, as has already been shown, did not believe in the
unfordability of rivers. Moreover, the Orange River in front of us was
falling, and further information, which had been arrived at through a
rather peculiar channel, furnished us with the details of a letter of
instruction which had been sent by De Wet when at Strydenburg to
Field-cornet Botmann, then commanding the local commando in the
Fauresmith district, instructing him to collect as many horses and
Cape-carts as possible, and to keep them in readiness at Philippolis
in order to expedite his (De Wet's) journey north. Basing his plans
upon this information, the brigadier determined to place himself on
the line Jagersfontein-Fauresmith just at the moment when De Wet
halted to catch his breath at Philippolis. He would then detach half
his force to cover his right, facing south, leaving it to Plumer or
other troops despatched from the railway at Jagersfontein Road to
cover and close his left flank. To frustrate the vigilance of
Botmann's observation-posts it was the brigadier's intention to make
Fauresmith by forced marches. It had to be considered that there was
only a small margin in which it would be possible to arrive at
Fauresmith with advantage. Too early an arrival would have warned and
headed De Wet before the flank-detached column was in position to
effectually co-operate; while dalliance on the line of march would
have missed him altogether. It was a manoeuvre which could not have
been successful without some element of luck, but which was destined
to be rendered still more difficult by the co-operation of the local
guide.

As it was, the man was not taken into the brigadier's confidence until
he issued his marching orders to his force, a bare two hours before
the column was destined to take the road. The guide had joined the
command with all the pomp and dignity attaching to a following of five
mounted native retainers. He was an Africander of a most marked type,
and opened his connection with the Intelligence officer with the
information that he was not an ordinary guide, that he only took his
instructions from the officer commanding the column,