effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to
the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2, 5, 8]. Such like effects, as also
those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority
of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their
causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to
produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be
foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot
consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as
when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such
things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in
His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in
the First Part (Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 57, A. 3; Q. 86, A. 4). Hence it is
written (Isa. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter,
and we shall know that ye are gods." Therefore if anyone presume to
foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to
God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines:
wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as
though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the
Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men."

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things
that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the
like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows
other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then
he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives
something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps
to himself, in an undue manner, the fo