of May preceding, on a supposition that about that
time we might arrive upon the coast. But on the account sent overland by
Pizarro of his own distresses, part of which they knew we must have
encountered, as we were at sea during the same time, and on their having
no news of us in eight months after we were known to set sail from St.
Catherine's, they were fully persuaded that we were either shipwrecked,
or had perished at sea, or at least had been obliged to put back again;
for it was conceived impossible for any ships to continue at sea during
so long an interval, and, therefore, on the application of the merchants
and the firm persuasion of our having miscarried, the embargo had been
lately taken off.

A NARROW ESCAPE.

This last article made us flatter ourselves that, as the enemy was still
a stranger to our having got round Cape Horn, and the navigation of these
seas was restored, we might meet with some considerable captures, and
might thereby indemnify ourselves for the incapacity we were now under of
attempting any of their considerable settlements on shore. And thus much
we were certain of, from the information of our prisoners, that whatever
our success might be as to the prizes we might light on, we had nothing
to fear, weak as we were, from the Spanish force in this part of the
world; though we discovered that we had been in most imminent peril from
the enemy when we least apprehended it, and when our other distresses
were at the greatest height. For we learned from the letters on board
that Pizarro, in the express he dispatched to the Viceroy of Peru after
his return to the River of Plate, had intimated to him that it was
possible some part at least of the English squadron might get round, but
that, as he was certain from his own experience that if they did arrive
in those seas it must be in a very weak and defenceless condition, he
advised the Viceroy, in order to be secure at all events, to fit out what
ships of force he had, and send them to the southward, where in all
probability they would intercept us singly and before we had an
opportunity of touching anywhere for refreshment, in which case he
doubted not but we should prove an easy conquest. The Viceroy of Peru
approved of this advice, and immediately fitted out four ships of force
from Callao, one of 50 guns, two of 40 guns, and one of 24 guns. Three of
them were stationed off the port of Concepcion,* and one of them at the
Island of Juan Fernande