ble ourselves about the opinion of the
many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?

I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how
courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to
abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think,
our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow;
but if not, never mind.

You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have
begun.

Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What
account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed
being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras
and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and
drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing
them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that
they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose
that you and I were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say
that they are evil,--in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the
moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils
in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil
consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure
of whatever nature?'--Would they not answer that they are not evil
on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on
account of the after consequences--diseases and the like?

I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as
you do.

And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty
do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not
mistaken?

Protagoras assented.

Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil
for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of
other pleasures:--there again they would agree?

We both of us thought that they would.

And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and
say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean
remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and
the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are
these the things which are good but painful?'--they would assent to me?

He agreed.

'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest