itative interest in the well-being of the
vulgar, through subscriptions or through work on managing committees and
the like. One may, perhaps even more meritoriously, show solicitude in
general and in detail for the cultural welfare of the vulgar, in the
way of contrivances for elevating their tastes and affording them
opportunities for spiritual amelioration. But one should not betray an
intimate knowledge of the material circumstances of vulgar life, or of
the habits of thought of the vulgar classes, such as would effectually
direct the efforts of these organizations to a materially useful end.
This reluctance to avow an unduly intimate knowledge of the lower-class
conditions of life in detail of course prevails in very different
degrees in different individuals; but there is commonly enough of
it present collectively in any organization of the kind in question
profoundly to influence its course of action. By its cumulative action
in shaping the usage and precedents of any such body, this shrinking
from an imputation of unseemly familiarity with vulgar life tends
gradually to set aside the initial motives of the enterprise, in favor
of certain guiding principles of good repute, ultimately reducible to
terms of pecuniary merit. So that in an organization of long standing
the initial motive of furthering the facility of life in these classes
comes gradually to be an ostensible motive only, and the vulgarly
effective work of the organization tends to obsolescence.

What is true of the efficiency of organizations for non-invidious
work in this respect is true also as regards the work of individuals
proceeding on the same motives; though it perhaps holds true with more
qualification for individuals than for organized enterprises. The habit
of gauging merit by the leisure-class canons of wasteful expenditure and
unfamiliarity with vulgar life, whether on the side of production or of
consumption, is necessarily strong in the individuals who aspire to do
some work of public utility. And if the individual should forget his
station and turn his efforts to vulgar effectiveness, the common sense
of the community-the sense of pecuniary decency--would presently
reject his work and set him right. An example of this is seen in the
administration of bequests made by public-spirited men for the single
purpose (at least ostensibly) of furthering the facility of human life
in some particular respect. The objects for which bequests of this