them by experience
to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind
wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my
perceiving them; as likewise they did before my birth, and
would do after my supposed annihilation. And as the same is true
with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily
follows there is an _omnipresent, eternal Mind_, which knows and
comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view in such a
manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath
ordained, and are by us termed the _Laws of Nature_.'

'Truth is the cry of all,' says Berkeley in the final paragraph
of _Siris_, 'but the game of a few. Certainly, where it is the
chief passion, it doth not give way to vulgar cares and views,
nor is it contented with a little ardour, active perhaps to
pursue, but not so fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a
real progress in knowledge, must dedicate his age as well as
youth, the latter growth as well as firstfruits at the altar of
truth.'

Elsewhere in this famous treatise he writes:

'It cannot be denied that with respect to the universe of things
we in this mortal state are like men educated in Plato's cave,
looking on shadows with our backs turned to the light. But
though our light be dim and our situation bad, yet if the best
use be made of both, perhaps something may be seen. Proclus, in
his commentary on the theology of Plato, observes there are two
sorts of philosophers. The one placed body first in the order of
beings, and made the faculty of thinking depend thereupon,
supposing that the principles of all things are corporeal; that
body most really or principally exists, and all other things in
a secondary sense and by virtue of that. Others making all
corporeal things to be dependent upon soul or mind, think this
to exist in the first place, and primary senses and the being of
bodies to be altogether derived from, and presuppose that of the
mind.'

This was Berkeley's creed, and his great aim throughout is to prove the
phenomenal nature of the things of sense, or in other words the
non-existence of independent matter. He makes, he says, not the least
question that the things we see and touch really exist, but what he does
question is the existence of matter apart from its perception to the
mind. Hobbes said that t