he new President had appointed as his cabinet William H. Seward,
Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon
Cameron, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb
B. Smith, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery Blair,
Postmaster-General; and Edward Bates, Attorney-General. The President
and his official advisers at once called into counsel the highest
military and naval officers of the Union to consider the new and
pressing emergency revealed by the unexpected news from Sumter. The
professional experts were divided in opinion. Relief by a force of
twenty thousand men was clearly out of the question. No such Union army
existed, nor could one be created within the limit of time. The officers
of the navy thought that men and supplies might be thrown into the fort
by swift-going vessels, while on the other hand the army officers
believed that such an expedition would surely be destroyed by the
formidable batteries which the insurgents had erected to close the
harbor. In view of all the conditions, Lieutenant-General Scott,
general-in-chief of the army, recommended the evacuation of the fort as
a military necessity.

President Lincoln thereupon asked the several members of his cabinet the
written question: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort
Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?" Only two
members replied in the affirmative, while the other five argued against
the attempt, holding that the country would recognize that the
evacuation of the fort was not an indication of policy, but a necessity
created by the neglect of the old administration. Under this advice, the
President withheld his decision until he could gather further
information.

Meanwhile, three commissioners had arrived from the provisional
government at Montgomery, Alabama, under instructions to endeavor to
negotiate a _de facto_ and _de jure_ recognition of the independence of
the Confederate States. They were promptly informed by Mr. Seward that
he could not receive them; that he did not see in the Confederate States
a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation; and
that he was not at liberty to recognize the commissioners as diplomatic
agents, or to hold correspondence with them. Failing in this direct
application, they made further efforts through Mr. Justice Campbell of
the Supreme Court, as a friendly intermediary, who came to Seward in the
guise of a loyal