step in and give
a man back his money when, under precisely the same circumstances,
the civil law will let him whistle?"

"What mean you by that?" asked my partner.

"Why," answered I, "the civil law will not settle disputes between
thieves, it will not enforce an equitable division of stolen
property, and it will not compel rogues to keep a dishonest contract
between themselves. Now this fellow, Jones, it seems to me, was
almost as bad as your friend McDuff. He tried to induce a man he
thought was a sworn officer of the law to violate his oath and
disregard his duty. Why should the criminal law do anything for
him? Why should it hand him back his money as if he were an innocent
and honest man?"

"It is an ingenious argument," replied Gottlieb, scratching his
ear; "and yet it is poppycock for all that. The criminal law is
to punish criminals. According to your reasoning, two wrongs would
make a right and two thieves one honest man. Would you let McDuff
go unpunished simply because he was clever enough to induce Jones
to try to break the law as well as himself? Why, any judge would
laugh you out of court on such a proposition."

"But," I retorted, "surely, if I gave you a hundred dollars for
the purpose of bribing a judge and you failed to accomplish your
purpose, no court would assist me to recover the money. 'Twould
be against public policy and _contra bonos mores_."

"Even so," answered my partner, "would it not be more _contra bonos
mores_ to let a thief go unpunished, once he had been arrested?
Take my word, Quib, there's nothing in it," insisted Gottlieb
warmly. "For instance, there is the crime against usury--a very
foolish law to be sure, but there it is. No one can commit usury
unless some one else participates in the offense by paying the
unlawful interest; but the usurer does not escape on that account.
Why, then, should the false pretender in our case?"

"I admit the force of your analogy," said I, "and I could easily
suggest others myself. Bribery, for instance; extortion and many
other offences, where the law does not refrain from punishing the
one because the other is equally guilty. But the cases differ in
that, in bribery, the briber is seeking to influence the acts of
an official; and, in extortion, the law imputes an element of force
which is supposed to overcome the will of the person paying the
money. I am not so clear on your usury. Still, I believe there
is a fighting chanc