consequently the carnage was greater than usually takes place in light
and skirmishing engagements. The resentment of the barbarians was
rather inflamed by this adverse battle, than their spirits depressed.
Accordingly, that they might not appear cast down, they marched out
into the field the following day as soon as it was light. The valley,
which was confined, as has been before stated, would not contain all
their forces. About two-thirds of their foot and all their cavalry
came down to the engagement. The remainder of their infantry they
stationed on the declivity of the hill. Scipio, conceiving that the
confined nature of the ground would be in his favour, both because the
Roman troops were better adapted for fighting in a contracted space
than the Spanish, and also because the enemy had come down and formed
their line on ground which would not contain all their forces, applied
his mind to a new expedient. For he considered that he could not
himself cover his flanks with his cavalry, and that those of the enemy
which they had led out, together with their infantry, would be unable
to act. Accordingly he ordered Laelius to lead the cavalry round by
the hills as secretly as possible, and separate, as far as he could,
the fight between the cavalry from that between the infantry. He
himself drew up the whole body of his infantry against the enemy,
placing four cohorts in front, because he could not extend his line
further. He commenced the battle without delay, in order that the
contest itself might divert the attention of the enemy, and prevent
their observing the cavalry which were passing along the hills. Nor
were they aware that they had come round before they beard the noise
occasioned by the engagement of the cavalry in their rear. Thus there
were two battles; two lines of infantry and two bodies of horse being
engaged within the space occupied by the plain lengthwise; and that
because it was too narrow to admit of both descriptions of force being
engaged in the same lines. When the Spanish infantry could not assist
their cavalry, nor their cavalry the infantry, and the infantry, which
had rashly engaged in the plain, relying on the assistance of the
cavalry, were being cut to pieces, the cavalry themselves also, being
surrounded and unable to stand the shock of the enemy's infantry
in front, (for by this time their own infantry were completely
overthrown,) nor of the cavalry in their rear, after having formed
thems
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