ngs. In one passage he complains that women
seemed to think of nothing but admiration and getting married; and, in
another, he observes, almost with a sneer, that the Roman ladies were
fond of Plato's _Republic_ because he allowed some very liberal marriage
regulations. We can only infer from these passages that he had been very
unfortunate in the specimens of women with whom he had been thrown. The
Roman ladies of his time were certainly not models of character; he was
not likely to fall in with very exalted females among the slaves of
Epaphroditus or the ladies of his family, and he had probably never
known the love of a sister or a mother's care. He did not, however, go
the length of condemning marriage altogether; on the contrary, he blames
the philosophers who did so. But it is equally obvious that he approves
of celibacy as a "counsel of perfection," and indeed his views on the
subject have so close and remarkable a resemblance to those of St. Paul
that our readers will be interested in seeing them side by side.

In 1 Cor. vii. St. Paul, after speaking of the nobleness of virginity,
proceeds, nevertheless, to sanction matrimony as in itself a hallowed
and honourable estate. It was not given to all, he says, to abide even
as he was, and therefore marriage should be adopted as a sacred and
indissoluble bond. Still, without being sure that he has any divine
sanction for what he is about to say, he considers celibacy good "for
the present distress," and warns those that marry that they "shall have
trouble in the flesh." For marriage involves a direct multiplication of
the cares of the flesh: "He that is unmarried careth for the things that
belong to the Lord, how he may please the Lord: but he that is married
careth for the things that are of the world, how he may please his
wife.... And this I speak for your own profit, not that I may cast a
snare upon you, _but for that which is comely, and that ye may attend
upon the Lord without distraction_."

It is clear, then, that St. Paul regarded virginity as a "counsel of
perfection," and Epictetus uses respecting it almost identically the
same language. Marriage was perfectly permissible in his view, but it
was much better for a Cynic (i.e. for all who carried out most fully
their philosophical obligations) to remain single: "Since the condition
of things is such as it now is, as though we were on the eve of battle,
_ought not the Cynio to be entirely without distraction_"