ome evident that the essential
work of anyone who is conversant with the existing practice and
literature of the law and whose natural abilities are forensic, will lie
in the direction of reconstructing the theory and practice of the law
in harmony with modern conceptions, of making that theory and practice
clear and plain to ordinary men, of reforming the abuses of the
profession by working for the separation of bar and judiciary, for the
amalgamation of the solicitors and the barristers, and the like needed
reforms. These are matters that will probably only be properly set right
by a quickening of conscience among lawyers themselves. Of no class of
men is the help and service so necessary to the practical establishment
of God's kingdom, as of men learned and experienced in the law. And
there is no reason why for the present an advocate should not continue
to plead in the courts, provided he does his utmost only to handle cases
in which he believes he can serve the right. Few righteous cases are
ill-served by a frank disposition on the part of lawyer and client
to put everything before the court. Thereby of course there arises a
difficult case of conscience. What if a lawyer, believing his client to
be in the right, discovers him to be in the wrong? He cannot throw up
the case unless he has been scandalously deceived, because so he would
betray the confidence his client has put in him to "see him through." He
has a right to "give himself away," but not to "give away" his client
in this fashion. If he has a chance of a private consultation I think he
ought to do his best to make his client admit the truth of the case and
give in, but failing this he has no right to be virtuous on behalf of
another. No man may play God to another; he may remonstrate, but that
is the limit of his right. He must respect a confidence, even if it is
purely implicit and involuntary. I admit that here the barrister is in a
cleft stick, and that he must see the business through according to the
confidence his client has put in him--and afterwards be as sorry as he
may be if an injustice ensues. And also I would suggest a lawyer
may with a fairly good conscience defend a guilty man as if he were
innocent, to save him from unjustly heavy penalties. . . .

This comparatively full discussion of the barrister's problem has been
embarked upon because it does bring in, in a very typical fashion,
just those uncertainties and imperfections that abound in