eal contests, but never awarded any
prize for wisdom. This question he solves as follows: In gymnastic
exercises the prize is better and more desirable than that for which it
is bestowed; but it is certain that nothing is better than wisdom:
wherefore no prize could be assigned for wisdom. And therefore neither
riches nor delights are more excellent than wisdom. Again, only the
fool will deny that friendship is to be preferred to riches, since the
wisest of men testifies this; but the chief of philosophers honours
truth before friendship, and the truthful Zorobabel prefers it to all
things. Riches, then, are less than truth. Now truth is chiefly
maintained and contained in holy books--nay, they are written truth
itself, since by books we do not now mean the materials of which they
are made. Wherefore riches are less than books, especially as the most
precious of all riches are friends, as Boethius testifies in the second
book of his Consolation; to whom the truth of books according to
Aristotle is to be preferred. Moreover, since we know that riches
first and chiefly appertain to the support of the body only, while the
virtue of books is the perfection of reason, which is properly speaking
the happiness of man, it appears that books to the man who uses his
reason are dearer than riches. Furthermore, that by which the faith is
more easily defended, more widely spread, more clearly preached, ought
to be more desirable to the faithful. But this is the truth written in
books, which our Saviour plainly showed, when he was about to contend
stoutly against the Tempter, girding himself with the shield of truth
and indeed of written truth, declaring "it is written" of what he was
about to utter with his voice.

And, again, no one doubts that happiness is to be preferred to riches.
But happiness consists in the operation of the noblest and diviner of
the faculties that we possess--when the whole mind is occupied in
contemplating the truth of wisdom, which is the most delectable of all
our virtuous activities, as the prince of philosophers declares in the
tenth book of the Ethics, on which account it is that philosophy is
held to have wondrous pleasures in respect of purity and solidity, as
he goes on to say. But the contemplation of truth is never more
perfect than in books, where the act of imagination perpetuated by
books does not suffer the operation of the intellect upon the truths
that it has seen to suffer interr