t
of sight and out of hearing. At such times, there was an apprehensive
feeling after the touch, which had to be kept in order to be sure that
we were on the right road. This was especially true of the heads of
subdivisions--the commanders of regiments--who were charged with the
responsibility of keeping in sight of those next in front.

The march was not only rapid but it was continuous. There was an air of
undue haste--a precipitancy and rush not all reassuring. Only the
stoical were entirely free from disquietude. Those of us who were with
the extreme rear, and who had not been admitted to the confidence of the
projectors and leaders of the expedition, began to conjecture what it
all meant, where we were going and, if the pace were kept up, when we
would get there, and what would be done when the destination was
reached. All the excitement and enjoyment were Dahlgren's; all the dull
monotony and nerve-racking strain ours.

The head of column reached Spottsylvania Courthouse at daylight. The
tail came trailing in as best it could, some time later. Here, in
accordance with the prearranged plan, Dahlgren with his six hundred
troopers separated from the main body, bearing to the westward and
following the direct road to Frederickshall station on the Virginia
Central railroad, his objective point being Goochland, about twenty
miles above Richmond on the James river. The plan was for Colonel
Dahlgren to cross the river at or near that place, move down on the
south side, and be in position to recross by the main bridge into
Richmond at ten o'clock, Tuesday morning, March 1, at the same moment
when Kilpatrick would enter the city from the north by way of the Brook
turnpike.[22]

But, "the best laid schemes o' mice and men gang aft a-gley." General
Sheridan pointed out that such combinations rarely work out as expected,
and that when an engagement with the enemy is liable to take place at
any moment it is better to keep the whole force well together.[23]

In this case for Kilpatrick to divide his force was a fatal error of
judgment. In the light of what took place it is now clear, as it ought
to have been at the time, that the entire command should have been kept
together, on one road. General Custer made the same mistake when he went
to his death at Little Big Horn, in 1876. The combination did not work
out as he expected. It may be entirely safe and proper for detachments
to be sent out to make diversions for the purpos