y, he set forth his intentions
in a few words. "You must be sensible," he said, "that the season is
fast approaching when a new campaign will open; nay, the former is not
yet closed; nor do I intend it shall be, unless the enemy quits the
Jerseys." To keep fighting all the time, and never let the fire of
active resistance flicker or die out, was Washington's theory of the
way to maintain his own side and beat the enemy. If he could not fight
big battles, he would fight small ones; if he could not fight little
battles, he would raid and skirmish and surprise; but fighting of some
sort he would have, while the enemy attempted to spread over a State
and hold possession of it. We can see the obstacles now, but we can
only wonder how they were sufficiently overcome to allow anything to
be done.

Moreover, besides the purely physical difficulties in the lack of men,
money, and supplies, there were others of a political and personal
kind, which were even more wearing and trying, but which,
nevertheless, had to be dealt with also, in some fashion. In order to
sustain the courage of the people Washington was obliged to give out,
and to allow it to be supposed, that he had more men than was really
the case, and so Congress and various wise and well-meaning persons
grumbled because he did not do more and fight more battles. He never
deceived Congress, but they either could not or would not understand
the actual situation. In March he wrote to Robert Morris: "Nor is it
in my power to make Congress fully sensible of the real situation
of our affairs, and that it is with difficulty, if I may use the
expression, that I can by every means in my power keep the life and
soul of this army together. In a word, when they are at a distance,
they think it is but to say, _Presto, begone_, and everything is done.
They seem not to have any conception of the difficulty and perplexity
attending those who are to execute." It was so easy to see what they
would like to have done, and so simple to pass a resolve to that
effect, that Congress never could appreciate the reality of the
difficulty and the danger until the hand of the enemy was almost at
their throats. They were not even content with delay and neglect, but
interfered actively at times, as in the matter of the exchange of
prisoners, where they made unending trouble for Washington, and showed
themselves unable to learn or to keep their hands off after any amount
of instruction.

In Januar