deny me the whole of that country when they lay down as a
principle that "The occupation of the Asiatic side by military forces is
to be strongly deprecated."

Secondly, because I agree that a landing between Saros Bay and Enos
would leave us no "forrarder." There we should be attacked in front from
Rodosto; in flank from Adrianople; in rear from Bulair; whilst, as we
advanced, we would lose touch with the Fleet. But if our scheme is to be
based on severance from the Fleet we must delay another month or six
weeks to collect pack transport.

Thirdly, the Asiatic side _does not_ dominate the Peninsula whereas the
Kilid Bahr plateau _does_ dominate the Asiatic narrows.

Fourthly, the whole point of our being here is to work hand-in-glove
with the Fleet. We are here to help get the Fleet through the
Dardanelles in the first instance and to help the Russians to take
Constantinople in the second. The War Office, the Admiralty, the
Vice-Admiral and the French Commander-in-Chief all agree now that the
Peninsula is the best place for our first step towards these objects.

Hunter-Weston's appreciation, written on his way out at Malta, is a
masterly piece of work. He understands clearly that our true objective
is to let our warships through the Narrows to attack Constantinople.
"The immediate object," he says, "of operations in the Dardanelles is to
enable our warships, with the necessary colliers and other unarmoured
supply ships--without which capital ships cannot maintain themselves--to
pass through the Straits in order to attack Constantinople."

And again:--

"It is evident that land operations at this stage must be directed
entirely towards assisting the Fleet; and no operations should be
commenced unless it is clear that their result will be to enable our
warships, with their necessary colliers, etc., to have the use of the
Straits."

The Fleet, he holds, cannot do this without our help because of:--

(1). Improvement of the defences.
(2). The mobile howitzers.
(3). The Leon floating mines.

Things being so, he sets himself to consider how far the Army can help,
in the light of the following premises:--

"The Turkish Army having been warned by our early bombardments and by
the landings carried out some time ago, has concentrated a large force
in and near the Gallipoli Peninsula."

"It has converted the Peninsula into an entrenched camp, has, under
German direction, made several lines of entrenchments co