h lies south-east of
Chattanooga. The battle fought among the woods and hills by Chicamauga
on September 19 and 20 surpassed any other in the war in the heaviness of
the loss on each side. On the second day Bragg's manoeuvres broke
Rosecrans' line, and only an extraordinarily gallant stand by Thomas with
a part of the line, in successive positions of retreat, prevented Bragg
from turning the hasty retirement of the remainder into a disastrous
rout. As it was, Rosecrans made good his retreat to Chattanooga, but
there he was in danger of being completely cut off. A corps was promptly
detached from Meade in Virginia, placed under Hooker, and sent to relieve
him. Rosecrans, who in a situation of real difficulty seems to have had
no resourcefulness, was replaced in his command by Thomas. Grant was
appointed to supreme command of all the forces in the West and ordered to
Chattanooga. There, after many intricate operations on either side, a
great battle was eventually fought on November 24 and 25, 1863. Grant
had about 60,000 men; Bragg, who had detached Longstreet for his vain
attack on Burnside, had only 33,000, but he had one steep and entrenched
ridge behind another on which to stand. The fight was marked by notable
incidents--Hooker's "battle above the clouds"; and the impulse by which
apparently with no word of command, Thomas' corps, tired of waiting while
Sherman advanced upon the one flank and Hooker upon the other, arose and
carried a ridge which the enemy and Grant himself had regarded as
impregnable. It ended in a rout of the Confederates, which was
energetically followed up. Bragg's army was broken and driven right back
into Georgia. To sum up the events of the year, the one serious invasion
of the North by the South had failed, and the dominion on which the
Confederacy had any real hold was now restricted to the Atlantic States,
Alabama, and a part of the State of Mississippi.

At this point, at which the issue of the war, if it were only pursued,
could not be doubted, and at which, as it happens, the need of Lincoln's
personal intervention in military matters became greatly diminished, we
may try to obtain a general impression of his wisdom, or want of it, in
such affairs. The closeness and keen intelligence with which he followed
the war is undoubted, but could only be demonstrated by a lengthy
accumulation of evidence. The larger strategy of the North, sound in the
main, was of course the product