ral Washington had never lived and that they were still
subjects of Queen Victoria; but I should certainly say as a rule the
Americans are much too well satisfied with themselves for this feeling
to be at all common. General Lee, in the course of this to me most
interesting evening's _seance_, gave me many details of the war too
long to put on paper, but, with reference to the small result of their
numerous victories, accounted for it in this way: the force which the
Confederates brought to bear was so often inferior in numbers to that
of the Yankees that the more they followed up the victory against one
portion of the enemy's line the more did they lay themselves open to
being surrounded by the remainder of the enemy. He likened the
operation to a man breasting a wave of the sea, who, as rapidly as he
clears a way before him, is enveloped by the very water he has
displaced. He spoke of the final surrender as inevitable owing to the
superiority in numbers of the enemy. His own army had, during the last
few weeks, suffered materially from defection in its ranks, and,
discouraged by failures and worn out by hardships, had at the time of
the surrender only 7,892 men under arms, and this little army was
almost surrounded by one of 100,000. They might, the General said with
an air piteous to behold, have cut their way out as they had done
before, but, looking upon the struggle as hopeless, I was not surprised
to hear him say that he thought it cruel to prolong it. In two other
battles he named (Sharpsburg and Chancellorsville, I think he said),
the Confederates were to the Federals in point of numbers as 35,000 to
120,000 and as 45,000 to 155,000 respectively, so that the mere
disparity of numbers was not sufficient to convince him of the
necessity of surrender; but feeling that his own army was persuaded of
the ultimate hopelessness of the contest as evidenced by their
defection, he took the course of surrendering his army in lieu of
reserving it for utter annihilation.

"Turning to the political bearing of the important question at issue,
the great Southern general gave me, at some length, his feelings with
regard to the abstract right of secession. This right, he told me, was
held as a constitutional maxim at the South. As to its exercise at the
time on the part of the South, he was distinctly opposed, and it was
not until Lincoln issued a proclamation for 75,000 men to invade the
South, which was deemed clearly u