e upper layer of the old noble class, the "Boyars," were but a
shadow of the Western contemporary medieval landed aristocracy. When the
several principalities became united with the Czardom of Muscovy many
centuries ago, the Boyar was in fact no more than a steward of the
Czar's estate and a leader of a posse defending his property; the most
he dared to do was surreptitiously to obstruct the carrying out of the
Czar's intentions; he dared not try to impose the will of his class upon
the crown. The other classes were even more apolitical. So little did
the several classes aspire to domination that they missed many golden
opportunities to seize and hold a share of the political power. In the
seventeenth century, when the government was exceptionally weak after
what is known as the "period of troubles," it convoked periodical
"assemblies of the land" to help administer the country. But, as a
matter of fact, these assemblies considered themselves ill used because
they were asked to take part in government and not once did they aspire
to an independent position in the Russian body politic. Another and
perhaps even more striking instance we find a century and a half later.
Catherine the Great voluntarily turned over the local administration to
the nobles and to that end decreed that the nobility organize themselves
into provincial associations. But so little did the nobility care for
political power and active class prerogative that, in spite of the
broadest possible charters, the associations of nobles were never more
than social organizations in the conventional sense of the word.

Even less did the commercial class aspire to independence. In the West
of Europe mercantilism answered in an equal measure the needs of an
expanding state and of a vigorous middle class, the latter being no less
ardent in the pursuit of gain than the former in the pursuit of
conquest. In Russia, on the other hand, when Peter the Great wanted
manufacturing, he had to introduce it by government action. Hence,
Russian mercantilism was predominantly a state mercantilism. Even where
Peter succeeded in enlisting private initiative by subsidies, instead of
building up a class of independent manufacturers, he merely created
industrial parasites and bureaucrats without initiative of their own,
who forever kept looking to the government.

Coming to more recent times, we find that the modern Russian factory
system likewise owes its origin to governmental in